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Abstract. The reliability improvement of no-break re-
dundant electrical systems is the first aim of the pro-
posed strategy. The failure of some UPS (Uninterrupt-
ible Power Supply) system may lead to the fire occur-
rence. The most used electrical configurations are pre-
sented and discussed in the paper. The innovation of
the proposed method consists of taking into account the
fire risk to improve the accuracy of wiring configura-
tion and components’ failure rate. Thorough research
on MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) data has been
performed for each wiring component and UPS. The
fire risk is taken into account introducing an equiva-
lent fire block in the Reliability Block Diagram scheme;
it has an MTBF value calculated form yearly statistics
of UPS fire events. The reliability of the most used
UPS electrical configurations is evaluated by means of
the RBD method. Different electrical systems have been
investigated and compared based on MTBF. The impor-
tance of fire compartmentation between two or more
UPS’ connected in parallel is proved here.
Keywords
Electrical installation, failure rate, fire risk,
MTBF, no-break power system, RBD, redun-
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1. Introduction
Ten years of maintenance activity in no-break electri-
cal installations reveals a lot of design errors and a lack
of reliability. Currently, it is common to evaluate the
reliability only for the equipment and for electrical sys-
tem’ components. Today, it can be noticed that there is
a defect in reliability evaluation of all project choices.
Many real fire case occurrences on UPS were caused
by power electronic or battery fail. The producers do
not consider fire hazard significant for the UPS device
and perform tests only in standard and good mainte-
nance conditions. The UPS machines are very vulnera-
ble and subjected to inadequate maintenance, overvolt-
ages, high temperature, working conditions, and other
electrical system malfunctions. Nowadays redundant
UPS’ are not isolated by a fire compartment. No-break
systems are often designed following a wrong guideline.
The standard procedure considered for reliability im-
provement consists of a simple installation of two UPS’,
which are connected in parallel. UPS power electronic,
Control Unit, manual and static bypass, batteries and
other system components are usually installed in the
same room. All devices are, therefore, exposed to the
same fire risk. Working UPS unit may be involved in
fire event caused by the failure of another UPS unit in
the same room, thus rendering the system redundancy
ineffective. Moreover, an emergency manual bypass
wired out of the UPS room is never installed. In those
conditions a fire event entails certainly the complete
failure of the no-break system. A short and contained
fire is also sufficient to generate smoke and risk of toxic
air; in this case nobody can access the UPS room and
technicians are obliged to communicate immediately
with the director to inform him of the imminent fail-
ure and recommend to stop all current operations. A
lot of fire case studies have been investigated; the com-
plete failure of the no break electrical system was often
due to the lack of fire compartmentations between two
UPS.
2. Reliability Model
The reliability evaluation for each electrical configura-
tion is based on the Reliability Block Diagram model
(RBD) [1], [2]. By means of this method, the MTBF of
UPS, Control Unit, batteries, switches, and other com-
ponents are represented. Data on UPS fire occurrence
frequency were obtained during ten years of consultant
activity in the hospitals. In about a hundred of case
studies the existence of two UPS’ room fire events is
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proved per year (2 % per year). Two hypotheses are
necessary to evaluate the failure rate [3] by statistical
data on fire risk. Firstly, the failure rate is constant in
time. Secondly, break components are not repairable
but quickly replaceable (MTTR = 0). The average
fire failure rate is defined as the ratio between number
of fires and number of studied events per time. It is
shown in Eq. (1):
λAVG =
NF
NTOT · T , (1)
where NF is the quantity of fire events, NTOT is the
number of observed systems and T is the observation
time. Subsequently the MTBF value is calculated [4]
in Eq. (2):
MTBFF =
1
λAVG
=
NTOT · T
NF
=
100 · 8760
2
=
= 438000 h.
(2)
Using the Eq. (2), the reliability calculation can be
based on different fire statistics. Moreover, calculation
can be developed implementing a parametric analy-
sis varying the value of fire statistic. The reliability
evaluation model is used based on these hypotheses.
Firstly, UPS is only considered as a no break system
that avoids voltage dips. Secondly, the continuous en-
ergy source is based only on power supplier’s grid or
emergency diesel generator.
3. MTBF Data
MTBF data on studied components have been de-
duced by an accurate statistical survey. Used data
were obtained from: Gold Book [5], some papers
[1], [6], [7], [8], [9] and many datasheets. The UPS’
MTBF is evaluated including the presence of the on-
board automatic static bypass and batteries. MTBF
value for the Fire Risk Factor block is pointed out by
the maintenance activity experience, Eq. (2). The av-
erage values of MTBF for all components are pointed
out in Tab. 1.
Tab. 1: Average MTBF of no-break system’s components.
Components Symbol
Failure rate
[failure·h−1] MTBF [h]
Battery (lead acid) BAT 8.52086·10−7 1173590
Circuit breaker CB 4.348·10−6 229991
Complete UPS module
(internal STS and
batteries included)
UPS 1.3779·10−5 72574
Control Unit CU 1.33333·10−6 750000
Fire Risk Factor FRF 2.28311·10−6 438000
Inverter INV 0.00002 50000
Rectifier REC 0.00002 50000
Static Transfer Switch STS 9.79499·10−6 102093
Switchgear Bus Bar SBB 1.08334·10−6 923068
4. MTBF Evaluation of
Various No-Break Electrical
Systems
4.1. One UPS
The reliability of a base configuration with only one
UPS is shown in this subsection.
UPS ROOM
UPS
SHORT-BREAK
BUSBAR
CB
CB
NO-BREAK
BUSBAR
LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
Fig. 1: No-break system with one UPS.
The Reliability Block Diagram of the one UPS con-
figuration is shown in Fig. 2.
CB FRF UPSSBB CB SBB
Fig. 2: RBD scheme of no-break system with one UPS.
The calculation shown in Eq. (3) reveals the to-
tal MTBF for the system configuration with only one
UPS.
MTBFT =
1
1
MTBFSBB
+
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFFRF
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS
+
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFSBB
=
= 37140 h = 4.2 years.
(3)
4.2. Two UPS Without Fire
Compartmentations
The configuration with two UPS‘ connected in parallel
is considered here. Each UPS has a rated power greater
than the load demand. Machines are installed in the
same room together with the batteries and without any
fire compartmentations. The respective configuration
scheme is shown in Fig. 3. The RBD scheme of that
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UPS1
UPS ROOM
UPS2
SHORT-BREAK
BUSBAR
CB CB
CB CB
NO-BREAK
BUSBAR
CU
LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
Fig. 3: No-break system with two UPS without fire compart-
mentations.
system is shown in Fig. 4, where it must be highlighted
that the Fire Risk Factor of both UPS‘ influences the
entire system.
CU
CB
CB
UPS2
SBB
CB
CB
UPS1
SBBFRF1 FRF2
Fig. 4: RBD scheme of no-break system with two UPS without
fire compartmentations.
The MTBF for that configurations is can be com-
puted with the use of Eq. (4), Eq. (5), Eq. (6) and
Eq. (7):
MTBFUPS =
=
1
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFUPS
+
1
MTBFCB
=
= 44494 h.
(4)
RUPS1UPS2 = RUPS1+RUPS2−RUPS1 ·RUPS2, (5)
where R [8] is the reliability and it is defined as
R = e
−
1
MTBF
· t
.
MTBFUPS1UPS2 =
∫ ∞
0
RUPS1UPS2 · dt =
= 66741 h.
(6)
MTBFT =
=
1
1
MTBFSBB
+
1
MTBFFRF1
+
1
MTBFFRF2
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFCU
+
1
MTBFUPS1UPS2
+
1
MTBFSBB
=
= 43385 h = 5 years.
(7)
Only one Control Unit is usually installed for an emer-
gency load switching between two UPS‘, that choice
makes the MTBF worse.
4.3. Two UPS in Different Fire
Compartments
The reliability of two fire compartmented UPS‘ is stud-
ied here. In Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, there are shown the sys-
tem configuration and the RBD scheme respectively.
UPS1
UPS ROOM1
UPS2
UPS ROOM2
SHORT-BREAK
BUSBAR
CB CB
CB CB
NO-BREAK
BUSBAR
CU
LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
Fig. 5: No-break system composed of two UPS with fire com-
partmentations.
CU
CB
CB
FRF2 UPS2
SBB
CB
CB
FRF1 UPS1
SBB
Fig. 6: RBD scheme of no-break system with two fire compart-
mented UPS.
In this case, each Fire Risk Factor is related exclu-
sively to the respective UPS. Calculations to evaluate
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the total MTBF are represented in Eq. (8), Eq. (9),
Eq. (10) and Eq. (11):
MTBFUPS =
1
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFFRF
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS
+
1
MTBFCB
= 40391 h.
(8)
RUPS1UPS2 = RUPS1+RUPS2−RUPS1 ·RUPS2. (9)
MTBFUPS1UPS2 =
∫ ∞
0
R12 · dt = 60587 h. (10)
MTBFT =
1
1
MTBFSBB
+
1
MTBFCU
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS1UPS2
+
1
MTBFSBB
=
= 49987 h = 5.7 years.
(11)
4.4. Two UPS‘ and One STS with
Fire Compartmentations
Another system improvement consists of installing a
safety external bypass over two UPS‘. All these de-
vices must be installed in different fire compartmented
rooms. In the Fig. 7 and Fig. 8 the configuration and
the RBD scheme are shown respectively.
According to the proposed system scheme, calcula-
tions to evaluate total MTBF are shown in Eq. (12),
Eq. (13), Eq. (14), Eq. (15), Eq. (16), Eq. (17), Eq. (18)
and Eq. (19).
MTBFUPS =
1
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFFRF
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS
+
1
MTBFCB
= 40391 h.
(12)
RUPS1UPS2 = RUPS1+RUPS2−RUPS1 ·RUPS2. (13)
MTBFUPS1UPS2 =
∫ ∞
0
R12 · dt = 60587 h. (14)
MTBFUPS1UPS2CU =
=
1
1
MTBFUPS1UPS2
+
1
MTBFCU
= 56058 h. (15)
UPS1
UPS ROOM1
UPS2
UPS ROOM2
STS
STS ROOM
CB
SHORT-BREAK
BUSBAR
CB CB
CB CB CB
NO-BREAK
BUSBAR
CU
LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
Fig. 7: No-break system made up of two UPS and one STS with
fire compartmentations.
CU
CB
CB
FRF2 UPS2
SBB
CB
CB
FRF1 UPS1
SBB
CB CB
STS
Fig. 8: RBD scheme for no-break system with fire compart-
mented UPS and STS.
MTBFSTS =
=
1
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFSTS
+
1
MTBFCB
=
= 54080 h.
(16)
RUPS1UPS2CUSTS = RUPS1UPS2CU+
+RSTS −RUPS1UPS1CU ·RSTS .
(17)
MTBFUPS1UPS2CUSTS =
=
∫ ∞
0
RUPS1UPS2CUSTS · dt = 82616 h.
(18)
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MTBFT =
=
1
1
MTBFSBB
+
1
MTBFUPS1UPS2CUSTS
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFSBB
= 70070 h = 8 years.
(19)
The total MTBF for compartmented system is 8
years. Calculations have been also performed for the
case of absence of fire compartmentations. Installing
two UPS‘ and one STS in the same room results in
MTBF of 6.4 years.
4.5. Three UPS‘ with Fire
Compartmentations
The system configuration made of three UPS‘ installed
in different rooms is studied here. The configuration
scheme is shown in Fig. 9.
UPS1
UPS ROOM1
UPS2
UPS ROOM2
UPS3
UPS ROOM3
CB
SHORT-BREAK
BUSBAR
CB CB
CB CB CB
NO-BREAK
BUSBAR
CU
LOW VOLTAGE SWITCHGEAR
Fig. 9: No-break system made of three fire compartmented
UPS.
The respective RBD scheme is shown in Fig. 10.
The total MTBF of the three UPS‘ configuration
is computed using the Eq. (20), Eq. (21), Eq. (22),
CU CB
CB
CB
FRF2 UPS2SBB
CB
CB
CBFRF3 UPS3
FRF1 UPS1
SBB
Fig. 10: RBD scheme for fire compartmented three UPS con-
figuration.
Eq. (23), and Eq. (24).
MTBFUPS =
=
1
1
MTBFCB
+
1
MTBFFRF
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS
+
1
MTBFCB
= 40391 h.
(20)
RUPS1UPS2 = RUPS1+RUPS2−RUPS1 ·RUPS2. (21)
RUPS1UPS2UPS3 = RUPS1UPS2 +RUPS3−
−RUPS1UPS2 ·RUPS3.
(22)
MTBFUPS1UPS2UPS3 =
=
∫ ∞
0
RUPS1UPS2UPS3 · dt = 76743 h.
(23)
MTBFT =
1
1
MTBFSBB
+
1
MTBFCU
+ · · ·
1
· · · 1
MTBFUPS1UPS2UPS3
+
1
MTBFSBB
=
= 60494 h = 6.9 years.
(24)
The total MTBF for three compartmented UPS‘ is
6.9 years. In case of absence of fire compartments for
the same configuration the reliability is studied; and
MTBF of 5.1 years is obtained for three UPS installed
in the same room. With respect to the configuration
with two UPS‘ and one STS, a little decrease of relia-
bility is to be noticed. This is due to the better MTBF
of the STS compared to the UPS. On the opposite, this
three system UPS permits all maintenance operations
during working activities.
5. Conclusions
Revised statistical data on MTBF components used
in no-break systems have been summarized here. A
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method to take into account the fire risk in a Reliabil-
ity Block Diagram model has been performed. The
reliability of seven different UPS configurations has
been studied by means of the RBD method. The total
MTBF has been computed for each configuration tak-
ing into account the effect of the devices’ fire compart-
mentation. The results of this comparative analysis are
shown in Fig. 11.
Fig. 11: MTBF for different no-break power systems by fire
compartmentation.
These MTBF results can be also converted to yearly
failure probability values by means of Eq. (25):
FP% =
1
MTBF
· 100. (25)
These results demonstrate the importance of fire
compartmentation for reliability improving in redun-
dant UPS systems, especially for hospitals and safety
systems. The more suitable configuration consists of
two UPS and one STS fire compartmented, which
achieves the best MTBF. Moreover, the three com-
partmented UPS‘ configuration and permits a complete
maintenance during system’s operation.
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